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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff-Respondent, i 
V . J 
JAMES WILLIAM HARRIS, l 
Defendant-Appellant. i 
t Case No. 880268-CA 
i Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of Burglary, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978); 
Criminal Mischief, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1978); and Assault, a class B misdemeanor 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-102 (1978), following a 
jury trial in Third Judicial District Court, in and for Tooele 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
26(b)(1) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict 
defendant of burglary, criminal mischief (a class A misdemeanor), 
and assault. 
2. Whether defendant was viewed shackled and 
handcuffed in the presence of members of the jury which thereby 
denied him a fair trial. 
3. Whether defendant has properly preserved the 
remaining issues raised in his brief for appellate review. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, James William Harris, was convicted by a 
jury of burglary, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 
(1978); criminal mischief (a class A misdemeanor), in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-106 (1978); and assault, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1978) in Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Tooele County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 31, 1985, Gaylene Grantham was preparing to 
a attend a Halloween party when defendant walked into her home 
unannounced and without knocking (T. B-96). Prior to October 
31, Gaylene and defendant had dated and had become rather 
serious; however, the relationship was very troubled and they 
were constantly arguing about each other's drinking habits and 
other jealousy related matters. (T. B-95, C-80) 
After defendant entered Gaylene's home, defendant 
argued with Gaylene for approximately fifteen minutes about 
whether she would attend her party without him (T. B-97). 
Although the couple had argued in the past, this particular 
argument scared Gaylene T. B-98). She hid in the bedroom and 
The pages of the trial transcripts have not been individually 
numbered into the record. The transcripts are contained in four 
volumes; October 28, 1987, October 29, 1987, October 30, 1987, 
and March 21, 1988 (post-trial motions and sentencing). The 
record references in this brief will be made to "A"# "B", "C", 
and "D" respectively, followed by the page number of the specific 
volume. (E.g., "B-3" for page 3 of the October 29 transcript.) 
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called defendant's mother and sister to come and get him (T. B-
97). She also called the people with whom she was going to the 
party, Kay Gollaher and Chris Stribbe, for assistance (T. B-98). 
Chris and Kay arrived at Gaylene's home approximately an hour and 
a half later (T. B-98). 
Defendant had been drinking that night and in the mean 
time had fallen asleep on Gaylene's floor (T. B-98, 99). Gaylene 
was afraid to leave defendant asleep in her house with her 
children so she had Chris, a long-time friend of defendant's, 
wake him up (T. B-99). In an effort to get the appellant out of 
Gaylene's home, Chris invited him to the party (T. B-99). 
Defendant insisted that Gaylene ride with him but 
Gaylene refused and instead rode with Chris and Kay (T. B-100). 
At Gaylene's refusal, defendant became very upset and grudgingly 
consented to follow behind in his own truck (T. C-87). 
Defendant had parked his truck on Gaylene's front lawn, 
something he had frequently done in the past to avoid blocking 
the driveway (T. C-82). He backed up quickly and drove over the 
fence (T. C-87). He did not stop upon initially hitting the 
fence but continued to drive completely over it, and did not stop 
afterwards to investigate the damage (T. C-88). Prior to 
defendant's conduct, the chain link fence and sliding gate were 
in good condition (T. B-135). As defendant was destroying the 
fence, Gaylene's baby-sitter, Carrie Sly, drove up to the house 
and witnessed his actions (T. C-13). She was so upset that she 
would not go into the house and left (T. C-13). 
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The conflict between defendant and Gaylene continued 
for the next several hours (T. B-102-108). Defendant followed 
Gaylene from bar to bar demanding that she leave with him (T. B-
102-108). On one occasion Chris had to intervene between 
defendant and Gaylene because of defendant's apparent lack of 
control and abusive language (T. B-103-104). 
Upon arriving home after evening of harassment, Gaylene 
immediately noticed her damaged fence (T. B-108). Defendant 
arrived shortly thereafter and laughed in Gaylene's face when she 
accused him of destroying her fence (T. B-110). Finally Gaylene 
had had enough and ordered defendant to leave her property (T. B-
110). Defendant did not leave, but instead once again invited 
himself into Gaylene's home (T. B-lll). Gaylene, Chris, and Kay 
were already inside and apparently before they could lock the 
door defendant entered the home (T. B-lll). Gaylene then 
demanded three or four times that he leave, but defendant refused 
(T. B-lll). 
Soon after entering her house, Gaylene noticed that her 
children were missing (T. B-lll). Gaylene asked the appellant 
where the children were and he responded that she would not get 
them back unless she left with him to talk; Gaylene refused and 
became distraught and began to cry (T. C-27, 44). After a night 
of frustration and rejection, defendant lost control and kicked 
Gaylene's television, causing a boom and the glass to shatter (T. 
B-113, 116). The damage to the television was estimated to be 
$300 (T. C-9). 
4-
Defendant continued to yell, and Kay then intervened 
and told him to leave (T. B-119). He refused to leave and shoved 
Kay aside, knocking her into the furniture (T. B-119). In the 
mean time Gaylene went into the kitchen, followed by Chris and 
Kay and then defendant (T. B-119). Still incensed with the 
situation and in an effort to intimidate Gaylene, defendant 
kicked Gaylene's microwave, causing it to explode and emit sparks 
(T. B-120, C-27). Defendant then threatened to kill Gaylene and 
made a move towards her (T. B-124). At this point Chris 
intervened to slow the appellant down. Defendant took a swing at 
Chris and a fight ensued (T. B-124-6). 
Finally, defendant agreed to leave. In a final display 
of anger, defendant kicked the lower panel out of Gaylene's 
screen door on his way out (T. B-127). 
Defendant caused damage to Gaylene's television in the 
amount of $300, to the microwave in the amount of $100 to $150, 
to the screen door in the amount of $89, and to the chain link 
fence in the amount of $502 (T. C-9, B-137, 140). 
Defendant testified that he did not intend to damage 
the fence, nor did he intend to assault anyone when he entered 
the house (T. C-74-5). He flatly denied damaging the television 
or microwave, and stated that someone else had apparently caused 
the damage before Gaylene arrived home (T. C-81). He also 
claimed that there was "no fight" with Chris, and, rather, that 
Chris had struck him repeatedly without provocation (T. C-83). 
The jury found defendant guilty of burglary, criminal 
mischief (class A misdemeanor), and assault (T. D-33). Defendant 
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was sentenced to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison 
for burglary, to one year for criminal mischief, and to six 
months for assault (T. D-33-34). The sentences were ordered to 
run concurrently, but were to be consecutive to the term of 
imprisonment he was then serving for an unrelated case (T. D-3-
4). He was also ordered to pay $1002 in restitution (T. D-35). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's 
guilt of Burglary, Criminal Mischief (a class A misdemeanor), and 
Assault. 
Defendant's contention that jurors viewed him on 
October 29 shackled and in handcuffs is not supported by the 
record. The bailiff, prison guard, and three male jurors were 
questioned by the trial court, and their statements established 
that the jurors had not seen defendant in shackles or handcuffs. 
Defendant's remaining arguments should not be 
considered by this Court because he has failed to properly cite 
to the record and to legal authority to support his contentions. 
Regardless, the arguments lack merit. Defendant received a fair 
trial and his convictions should be sustained. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT OF BURGLARY, CLASS A CRIMINAL 
MISCHIEF AND ASSAULT. 
In points I, II and III of defendant's brief, he claims 
that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of burglary, 
criminal mischief (a class A misdemeanor) and assault. The Utah 
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Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated the standard of review 
on appeal when the argument concerns sufficiency of the evidence. 
The Court accords great deference to the jury verdict. It is 
exclusively the function of the jury to weigh the evidence and 
determine the credibility of witnesses. "The Court should only 
interfere when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that 
reasonable men could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt.- State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 
App. 1987), quoting State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). 
Furthermore, the defendant has the burden of establishing Hthat 
the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime.- State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 
1985) quoting State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980). 
All evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence 
should be reviewed in a light most favorable to the jury verdict. 
When the evidence is so viewed, the Court reverses only when the 
evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
concerning the defendant's guilt. State v. Honda Motorcycle, 735 
P.2d 392 (Utah App. 1987), citing State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 
(Utah 1985). The Court has succinctly stated that unless there 
is a clear showing of a lack of evidence, the jury verdict will 
be upheld. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at 412. See also State v. Logan, 
563 P.2d 811, 814 (Utah 1977). 
A person commits criminal mischief if he intentionally 
damages, defaces, or destroys another's property. Utah Code Ann. 
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S 76-6-106(1)(c) (1978). If the actor's conduct results in 
damage in excess of $500 and less that $1,000, the conduct is a 
class A misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(2)(a) (1978). 
The evidence established that the cost to repair 
Gaylene's T.V. would be approximately $300 (T. C-5). The $300 
figure did not include any incidental damage resulting from the 
defendant's kick (T. C-5-6). The microwave was destroyed by 
defendant and its value was established at between $75 and $150 
(T. C-7, C-59). The door the appellant kicked could not be 
repaired; its original cost was $89 (T. B-140). The cost to 
repair the damage to the fence was $502 (T. B-138). The cost of 
repair for the fence, alone, was more than sufficient to 
establish the requisite $500 amount to establish the class A 
category of criminal mischief. 
Defendant denied intentionally damaging the fence (T. 
C-82). However, on many prior occasions, he had parked his truck 
on Gaylene's lawn, and he routinely backed out of Gaylene's yard 
without difficulty (T. C-88). He was very angry at Gaylene 
because she refused to ride with him (T. C-87). Carrie Sly 
observed defendant back over the fence very fast (T. C-13). 
After what she had seen, she would not go into the house to baby-
sit (T. C-13). Further, defendant did not simply hit the fence 
with his rear bumper and stop, which would be expected if the act 
were accidental. Rather, he completely backed over the fence and 
continued on his way without stopping (T. C-13). The evidence 
was sufficient to find that defendant acted intentionally when he 
backed over the fence and that he intentionally kicked in the 
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television, microwave and screen door. The the verdict of 
criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor, should, therefore, be 
sustained. 
A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a dwelling with the intent to commit an assault on 
any person. Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978). 
The relationship between defendant and Gaylene was 
extremely troubled. While it is true that at one time defendant 
had a key to Gaylene's home, the relationship had since 
deteriorated. The relationship had so deteriorated that Gaylene 
had previously obtained a protective order in an effort to keep 
defendant away from her (T. C-95). 
The burglary occurred after Gaylene returned home from 
the party. She noticed that her fence was damaged and confronted 
defendant about it; he laughed at her (T. C-95). After a night 
of being harassed by defendant, Gaylene ordered him to leave (T. 
B-110). Defendant refused to leave and entered Gaylene's home. 
Once inside, Gaylene again ordered him to leave three or four 
times (T. B-lll). Seeing that her children were gone, Gaylene 
questioned defendant concerning their whereabouts (T. B-lll). 
Defendant then threatened Gaylene that if she didn't leave with 
him, she wouldn't get her children back (T. B-112). After 
Gaylene again refused to leave, defendant's frustration peaked 
and he became physically violent (T. B-3). The jury had more 
than adequate evidence to find the defendant unlawfully entered 
or remained in Gaylene's home, and that he intended to do 
anything necessary, including assault, to have Gaylene leave with 
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him. The evidence to establish burglary was not so inconclusive 
or improbable that the jury incorrectly reached its verdict. The 
burglary conviction should, therefore, be sustained. State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985). 
A person is guilty of assault when that person 
attempts, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1978). After defendant had 
unlawfully entered Gaylene's home and remained despite her orders 
that he leave, his behavior became frightening to Gaylene and the 
others. In a fit of anger he kicked the T.V. and microwave, he 
then threatened to kill Gaylene and made a move towards her (T. 
C-28-29, B-124). He also pushed Kay into a speaker, causing her 
to be extremely frightened of him (T. C-44-46). 
The evidence supports the jury's conclusion that 
defendant committed at least one assault. The evidence was not 
so insubstantial or lacking that a reasonable person could not 
have reached a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at 412. Therefore, the verdict on this count 
should be sustained. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT JURORS VIEWED HIM 
IN SHACKLES AND HANDCUFFS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE RECORD. 
In Point V of defendant's brief, he argues that some 
members of the jury observed him in shackles and handcuffs and, 
additionally, that he was prejudiced because of courtroom 
security. 
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Defendant's contentions are not supported by the 
record. On October 28, the first day of trial, defendant moved 
for a mistrial because jurors had viewed him handcuffed (T. A-
11). The court questioned some of the jurors and found that a 
juror had, in fact, seen defendant while he was handcuffed (T. A-
17). Defendant's motion for a mistrial was granted and the trial 
was rescheduled for the following day (T. A-19). 
On October 29, defendant again moved for a mistrial, 
claiming that jurors had again seen him in handcuffs (T. B-48). 
Defendant's contention is not supported by the record. First, 
defendant has provided no record cites to justify his argument. 
On this basis alone, this Court should decline to review his 
claim. R. Utah Ct. App. 24(a)(9); State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 
(Utah 1986). 
If this Court reaches the merits, defendant's argument 
is nevertheless without substance. The jury was composed of five 
women and three men (R. 26). Defendant was unable to identify 
which of the three male jurors had allegedly seen him in 
handcuffs (T.B-51, 52). The court questioned the court bailiff, 
the prison guard, and the three male jurors concerning 
defendant'8 allegations. 
The bailiff stated that the jurors could not have seen 
defendant in handcuffs because the jurors were in the courtroom 
during the time they were to have allegedly seen defendant in the 
hall (T. B-53). The prison guard corroborated the bailiff's 
statements (T. B-53). Additionally, each male juror denied 
having seen defendant in handcuffs (T. B-58-62). 
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After defendant'8 initial argument failed, defense 
counsel then contended that courtroom security was excessive and 
prejudicial (T. B-55). Counsel claimed that even if the jury did 
not see defendant in handcuffs, defendant was so closely 
supervised that it gave the impression of incarceration (T. B-
55). 
Courtroom security is essential element of the criminal 
trial system, especially when the defendant is incarcerated. The 
trial court was sensitive to defendant's claim, yet indicated 
that the security measures were necessary and was not willing to 
sacrifice security for a perceived prejudice (T. B-55). Further, 
the record does not establish that the security measures were 
excessive or so obvious and prejudicial that defendant is 
entitled to a new trial. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS THAT HE WAS DENIED 
"COUNSEL OF -CHOICE,M DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
CROSS EXAMINATION, DENIED A FAIR TRIAL 
BECAUSE OF A "CONFLICT OF INTEREST" BETWEEN 
HIM AND THE STATE, THAT THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
WERE IMPROPER, AND THAT THE TRANSCRIPT DENIES 
HIS RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE APPEAL, HAVE NOT 
BEEN PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THIS COURT AND ARE 
WAIVED. 
Defendant's arguments in Points IV through IX of his 
brief should not be considered on appeal because of his failure 
to properly raise any appealable issue, for failure to properly 
cite the record, and for failure to support his arguments with 
legal authority. 
It is well established that an appellate court, absent 
limited exception, will not consider allegations of error that 
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are not supported by the record and by some legal authority. 
State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986)? State v. Williamson, 674 
P.2d 132 (Utah 1983). 
Under Rule 24(a)(9), Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, an appellant's brief shall include -the contentions of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented and the 
reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes, 
and parts of the record relied on." R. Utah Ct. App. 24(a)(9) 
(1988) (emphasis added). 
Points IV and V of defendant's brief do not contain 
proper citations to the record. Reference is made to a 
particular day of the record. However, reference must be made to 
the pages of the transcript which support his contention. 
R. Utah Ct. App. 24(e). In State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 
1986), the Court held that failure to refer to pages of the 
record required the Court to assume the correctness of the 
proceedings and judgment appealed from. Further, Points IV and V 
fail to raise any relevant statutory or constitutional authority 
to support his claim. 
Point VI is wholly irrelevant to the case. No attempt 
was made to cite the record. The record, in fact, is devoid of 
evidence to support defendant's claim. Defendant's argument 
must, therefore, fail. Olmos, 712 at 287; R. Utah Ct. App. 
24(e). 
Point VII of defendant'8 brief contains a cite to the 
record, however, a perceived unfairness is an insufficient ground 
for appeal when unsupported by statutory or constitutional 
authority. Cook, 714 P.2d at 297. 
In Point VIII, defendant fails to raise an appealable 
issue. He contends the jury instructions are deficient. 
However, he fails to include his specific contention of error, 
and has not provided legal authority to support his claim as 
required by R. Utah Ct. App. 24(a)(9). 
In Point IX, defendant claims that an error in the 
transcript has denied his right to an adequate appeal. However, 
again, defendant fails to support legal authority on which he 
bases his claim for relief. He has, therefore, waived this 
argument. Regardless, it is incumbent on an appellant to provide 
the record on appeal. R. Utah Ct. App. 11(c). The error in this 
case is obvious. Pages of the transcript (186-94) are contained 
at the end of the October 29 volume which should have been 
contained at the end of the October 30 volume. The relevant 
pages of transcript, pages 186-87 include a section relating to a 
question by the jury. Pages 188-94 of the transcript include the 
jury verdict. These pages should have obviously been attached to 
the end of the October 30 transcript. The error, however, is 
harmless. Any error that does not affect the substantial rights 
of a defendant should be disregarded. Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). 
Further, defendant had the opportunity to have the error 
corrected, but did not. Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b). 
Defendant's brief raises issues unsupported by the 
record, and otherwise cited the record where legal issues were 
non-existent. The State respectfully requests that due to the 
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ambiguity of defendant's brief and lack of legal and record 
support, that this Court deem these issues waived. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm defendant's conviction. 
DATED this lyy" day of .'ftUUAfl/U^ 1989. 
^ 9 A R A BEARNSON (JT 
Assistant Attorney General 
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